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Abstract. We study the statistics of turnout rates and results of the French elections since 1992. We find
that the distribution of turnout rates across towns is surprisingly stable over time. The spatial correlation
of the turnout rates, or of the fraction of winning votes, is found to decay logarithmically with the distance
between towns. Based on these empirical observations and on the analogy with a two-dimensional random
diffusion equation, we propose that individual decisions can be rationalised in terms of an underlying “cul-
tural” field, that locally biases the decision of the population of a given region, on top of an idiosyncratic,
town-dependent field, with short range correlations. Using symmetry considerations and a set of plausible
assumptions, we suggest that this cultural field obeys a random diffusion equation.
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1 Introduction
Making decisions is an everyday necessity. In many cases,
these decisions are of binary nature: to buy or not to buy
a product or a stock, to get vaccinated or not, to partici-
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pate to a vote or not. Elections are in fact themselves often
binary, like referendums, or second round of presidential
elections, etc. The final decision of each individual is the
result of many factors: individual propensities, common
factors (such as prices, reliability of the vaccine, impor-
tance of the election, etc.), and, in many cases, the deci-
sions of others play a major role as well. Whether we like
it or not, imitation is deeply rooted in living species as a
strategy for survival. We, as humans, are influenced by our
kindred both at a primitive level (fear of being excluded
from the group) and at a rational level (others may pos-
sess some information unknown to us). Imitation can lead
to collective effects like trends, fashions and bubbles that
would be difficult to understand if we were insensitive to
the behaviour of others. These imitation induced opinion
shifts can be beneficial for a society as a whole (as in the
case of vaccination), but can also be detrimental and lead
to major catastrophes (crowd panic, financial crashes, eco-
nomic crises, rise of extremist ideologies, etc.). Develop-
ing reliable models for these collective effects is therefore
of primary importance, see [1–8]. This requires, in partic-
ular, to garner quantitative empirical information about
the imitation processes that may induce strong distortions
in the final outcome (see for example [9] for a precise ex-
perimental set up to measure these effects, and [10] for a
theoretical framework.)
In order to study the nature of these behavioural corre-
lations, we have studied the space-resolved (town by town)
results of the French elections since 1992. To keep the
model and the interpretation of the results simple, we re-
strict to binary choice situations, i.e, either the turnout
rates for each election, or the results of yes/no referen-
dums or second round of presidential elections. We anal-
yse in details the statistics of these outcomes, with special
focus on the dependence of the results on the size of the
cities, and on the spatial correlations between the different
results. While there might be some indications of direct
imitation effects within towns, the structure of inter-town
correlations strongly suggests the existence of what we
propose to call a ‘cultural’ field, that evolves in time ac-
cording to a noisy diffusion equation. This cultural field
encodes local biases in intentions, convictions or propensi-
ties on a given subject, for example to vote or not to vote,
or to vote left or right, to respect or not speed limitations,
etc. etc. These (subject specific) cultural fields transcend
individuals while being shaped, shared, transported and
transformed by them. Although the existence of such cul-
tural fields has been anticipated by sociologists, political
scientists and geographers (see [11] for an early insight,
and [12,13] for more recent discussions), we believe that
our empirical results provide the first quantitative evidence
for such a concept, and lay forward the possibility of a pre-
cise modelisation of its spatio-temporal evolution. Let us
emphasise an important conceptual point: these cultural
fields should exist independently of any election, or any
other occasions where a decision has to be made. These
events provide an instantaneous snapshot of the opinion
or of the behaviour of individuals, which are in part influ-
enced by these fields, in a way that we will quantify below.
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The cultural field has a dynamics of its own, that we will
model and elaborate on in section 4 below.
Most of the empirical electoral studies previously re-
ported in the physics literature deal with proportional vot-
ing from multiple choice lists, and investigate the distri-
bution of votes; as in Brazil [14–17], in Brazil and In-
dia [18], in India and Canada [19], in Mexico [20,21], in
Indonesia [22]. A universal behaviour was reported in [23].
Statistical results of elections for the city mayor are stud-
ied in [24], the typology of Russian elections in [25], cor-
relations between electoral results and party members in
Germany in [26], and statistics of votes per cabin for three
Mexican elections in [27]. Majority and Media effects were
investigated for various countries in [28]. Lastly, the spread
of Green Party in several states in the USA is analysed by
means of epidemiological models in [29], and data from
a Finland election is confronted to a Transient Opinion
Model [30]. See also [31,32] for Political Science studies of
electoral participation.
The specific feature of the present work is the quan-
titative analysis of the spatial correlations of the voting
patterns. We will first describe several striking empirical
regularities in the French vote statistics (that we believe
are not restricted to French elections). We then turn to
simple models that help putting these findings in context,
and explain why the idea of a diffusive cultural field, which
is the central proposal of this work, naturally accounts for
some of our findings.
2 Empirical regularities and spatial
correlations
We have analysed the turnout rate of all French elec-
tions [33] with national choices since 1992 (13 events).
A subset of 6 elections offered a binary choice to voters: 3
referendums and 3 second round of presidential elections
(See Table 1 for details and summary statistics). The na-
tional results are broken down into ≃ 36, 000 local results,
corresponding to communes (towns), of various popula-
tion sizes. For each voter i, we define Si = 1 to correspond
to participation to the vote or belonging to the majority
vote, whereas Si = 0 corresponds to not participating, or
belonging to the minority vote. For a town α, the total
number of potential voters is Nα; the total number of vot-
ers is Vα =
∑Nα
i=1 Si, the turnout rate is pα = Vα/Nα and
the total number of winning votes is Wα. We found con-
venient to work with logarithmic rates for participation or
winning votes: τα = ln(Vα/Nα − Vα) = ln(pα/1− pα) and
ρα = ln(Wα/Vα−Wα). Each commune is characterised by
the spatial coordinates [34] of its mairie (town-hall), Rα.
The distance between two communes, rαβ , is defined as
rαβ = |Rα −Rβ| (even if the presence of – say – moun-
tains or rivers in between would make the actual travelling
distance much longer).
The issues at stake in all these elections are clearly
very different, and so it is not a priori obvious that any-
thing universal (across different elections) can be found in
the statistics of votes. However, to our surprise, we found
a number of empirical regularities that we now detail, fo-
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the elections studied in this paper. R.: referendum (1992: Maastricht treaty, 2000: reduction of
the presidential mandate to 5 years, 2005: European constitutional treaty); E.: European parliament election; P.1: first round
of a presidential election; P.2: second round of a presidential election. Mean value (mean), standard-deviation (sd), skewness
(skew) and kurtosis (kurt) of logarithmic turnout rates τα (left), and of logarithmic winning vote rates ρα (right). Data is for
metropolitan France only.
election kind
∑
α
Vα∑
α
Nα
mean sd skew kurt
∑
α
Wα∑
α
Vα
mean sd skew kurt
1992-b R. 0.713 1.13 0.355 1.05 5.48 0.508 -0.164 0.447 -0.159 2.48
1994-m E. 0.539 0.358 0.398 0.837 9.23
1995-m P.1 0.795 1.60 0.375 0.928 5.37
1995-b P.2 0.805 1.72 0.398 1.35 5.54 0.525 0.187 0.524 0.357 2.71
1999-m E. 0.478 0.146 0.392 1.15 7.50
2000-b R. 0.308 -0.626 0.377 0.858 8.27 0.729 0.874 0.498 -0.116 2.77
2002-m P.1 0.729 1.24 0.347 1.25 9.46
2002-b P.2 0.810 1.67 0.367 1.26 6.40 0.820 1.48 0.521 0.776 2.26
2004-m E. 0.434 -0.095 0.366 1.45 9.82
2005-b R. 0.711 1.13 0.351 1.58 12.0 0.550 0.377 0.443 -0.021 1.37
2007-m P.1 0.854 1.98 0.396 1.06 8.02
2007-b P.2 0.853 1.99 0.394 1.22 5.28 0.533 0.257 0.487 0.174 2.31
2009-m E. 0.414 -0.147 0.360 1.35 8.28
cussing first on turnout rates where these regularities are
most robust. Very similar results are also found for win-
ning votes – see below.
The simplest quantity to look at is the pdf of the loga-
rithmic turnout rate τ over different communes, i.e. what
is the probability P (τ)dτ that a given commune, irrespec-
tive of its size, has a turnout rate τ to within dτ . Al-
though the average turnout rate m = 〈τ〉 varies quite
substantially between elections (see Table 1), the shape
of the distribution of τˆ = τ − m is remarkably constant
– even without rescaling by the root mean square σ, see
Fig. 1. The first three cumulants of P (τ) are, within error
bars, the same for all elections (see Table 1). In fact, a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test where one only allows for a rel-
ative shift of the distributions does not allow one to reject
the hypothesis that P (τˆ/σ) is indeed the same for all elec-
tions (except perhaps 2009 which gives marginal results).
Note that the distribution of τ is clearly non Gaussian,
with significant positive skewness and kurtosis.
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Fig. 1. Distribution over communes of P (τ − 〈τ 〉) for each
election, where τ is the logarithmic turnout rate and 〈τ 〉 its
average over all communes. The suffix -b means the election
is of binary nature, while -m means multiple choice elections.
The inset shows the distributions of direct turnout rates, p, for
each election.
The statistics of τ does in fact depend on the commune-
size N . We find that both the mean and variance of the
conditional distribution P (τ |N) decrease with N – see
Fig. 2; in particular, small communes have a larger av-
erage turnout rate (this explains the positive skewness of
P (τ) noted above [35]), but also a larger dispersion around
the average. This is of course expected for a simple bino-
mial process, which predicts that σ2τ (N) = 1/Np(1− p) +
Σ2, where p is the (N -dependent) average turnout rate,
whereas Σ2 describes the ‘true’ variance of the turnout
rate. The simplest assumption is thatΣ2 isN -independent,
in which case the observed variance varies significantly
faster (by a factor 2 or so) than the simple binomial pre-
diction that assumes independent voters, see Fig. 2, inset.
A possible interpretation is that the votes of different in-
dividuals are not independent within the same commune,
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Fig. 2. Mean (main figure) and variance (inset) of the con-
ditional distribution P (τ |N). These quantities are obtained as
averages over bins with one thousand communes of size ≈ N .
leading to an effectively smaller value of N in the bino-
mial. One can for example assume that within families,
or groups of close friends, the decision to vote or not to
vote is exactly the same. If the size distribution of these
groups of “clones” is Q(s), then it is easy to show that for
N large enough, these correlations in decision amount to
replacing N by N〈s〉Q/〈s2〉Q ≤ N . An explicit example
is Q(s) = (1 − z)zs−1 for s = 1, 2, . . ., which leads to an
effective value of N reduced by a factor (1 − z)/(1 + z).
In order to account for a factor of 2 in the variation of σ2τ
with N , we therefore need to choose z ≈ 1/3. Since z is
the probability that the group is larger than s = 1, this
looks quite large. In fact, as we will discuss below, there
is an alternative interpretation of the excess variance that
does not rely on direct imitation.
Let us now turn to the spatial correlations between
turnout rates, measured by the following correlation func-
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tion:
Cτ (r) =
〈(τα −mα)(τβ −mβ)〉|rαβ=r
〈(τα −mα)2〉 , (1)
where mα is the average of τ over all communes with size
in the same “bin” as that of α, so as to remove system-
atic spatial correlations between town sizes. The central
result of our empirical study is that for all elections, Cτ (r)
is long-range correlated. It is found to decay as the loga-
rithm of the distance (see Fig. 3, left): for 0 < r < L,
Cτ (r) = −λ2 ln(r/L), and Cτ (r > L) ≈ 0. Whereas the
logarithmic slope λ2 depends on the election and varies
by a factor at most 2 (between 1999 and 2007) the cut-
off distance L is, remarkably similar for all elections, with
L ≈ 300 km. In order to visualise more directly the corre-
lations between neighbouring towns, we have also studied
the relation between τα and the average of τβ over the 16
β towns closest to α. We find a very good linear regression
between the two over the whole range of τ ’s, with a slope
equal to unity (not shown, see [35]).
The same general picture holds for the statistics of
winning votes, except that: (a) the distribution of the log-
arithmic winning rate P (ρ) is much less universal across
elections than P (τ). We have noticed in particular that
the skewness of P (ρ) varies significantly between elections,
and changes sign between presidential elections, where it
is positive, and referendums, where it is negative. Con-
trarily to 〈τ〉|N , 〈ρ〉|N does not show any systematic pat-
tern, whereas σ2ρ(N) is again significantly larger than the
simple binomial prediction; (b) the spatial correlation of
winning votes Cρ is also logarithmic with r (see Fig. 3,
right), although the 2002 result shows a more pronounced
curvature. The value of the cut-off distance L is similar
to the one reported above, whereas the slope λ2 tends to
be larger, except in the 2000 election (see [35] for more
details, and also for more statistical regularities in these
elections.)
3 Theoretical insights and threshold models
The long-range, logarithmic dependence of the correlation
functions Cτ (r) and Cρ(r) is the most striking finding of
our study, in particular because it is strongly reminiscent
of the behaviour of the correlation function of a free diffu-
sion field in two dimensions. More precisely, let φ(R, t) be
a two-dimensional field that obeys the following stochastic
dynamical equation:
∂φ(R, t)
∂t
= D∆φ(R, t) + η(R, t), (2)
where∆ is the two-dimensional Laplacian,D is a diffusion
constant and η a Langevin noise with zero mean, variance
σ2η and short-range correlations both in time and in space.
It is well known that the equal-time correlation of φ is (in
equilibrium) given by:
Cφ(r) =
〈φ(r)φ(0)〉
〈φ(0)2〉 ≈ −Λ
2ln
r
L
, ℓc ≪ r ≪ L, (3)
where ℓc is a short scale cut-off (for example the corre-
lation length of the noise η) and L is the linear size of
the system. The behaviour of Cφ(r) for r < ℓc and the
logarithmic slope Λ2 depend on short scale details of the
model, but not on the the diffusion constant D. The time
to reach equilibrium, beyond which the above result holds,
is Teq = L
2/D. The logarithmic behaviour is a hallmark
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of the two-dimensional nature of the problem. The strik-
ing similarity between this prediction and our empirical
findings is the motivation of the theoretical analysis that
we present now.
There is quite a large literature on binary decision
models (see [1,36] for classical references, and [5,4,7,8,
37–40] for more recent contributions), although the spa-
tial correlations that we want to include appear to be new.
1 It is natural to think about these situations in terms of
thresholds [1]: although the decision is binary, the process
leading to the final choice is in fact continuous and reflects
the individual motivations, propensities or utilities, that
we will call the intention ϕi, where i labels the individu-
als. When ϕ exceeds a certain threshold Φc, the decision
S is one way – say S = 1; when ϕ is below this thresh-
old, S = 0. The process ϕ is in general time dependent
because individuals are influenced by a variety of factors:
what they read, what they hear, what they see contribute
to the way they understand a given situation and react to
it. Some of these influences are idiosyncratic, i.e. unique
to each individual (for example, one may be ill on an elec-
tion day, meaning that the propensity to go out and vote
is very low), while others are common to people living in
the same area (for example, the quality of public goods
in a given town, or the unemployment rate, etc.). Finally,
an important influencing factor is the decision Sj made
by others, if it is known before making one’s own mind,
1 We are aware of a “spatial theory of political choices” (see
[41]), but this is a misnomer: ‘spatial’ in that case refers to a
distance in the abstract space of convictions.
or by the intentions ϕj of others (see e.g. [1,4,5,7–9,42]).
For example, the decision to go see a movie, or to carry-
ing on clapping at the end of concerts or shows, may well
depend on what others have done in the past or are cur-
rently doing. In the first example, the number of people
having already seen the movie feeds back on the motiva-
tion of those who have not yet seen it, through box-office
charts or word of mouth. In the second example [7], the
amplitude of clapping generated by the rest of the crowd
can be directly perceived and is an incentive to continue
the applause. But in other situations where the decision is
taken simultaneously and the final result is only known a
posteriori (like in elections), this direct imitation mecha-
nism cannot be present – although of course the influence
of intentions is possible, and will be explicitly included in
the model below.
The above discussion suggest a general decomposition
of the individual intention field ϕi into an idiosyncratic
part, a ‘cultural’ part and an imitation part. More for-
mally, for an individual i living in the vicinity of R, the
intention at time t is written as: 2
ϕi(t) = ǫi(t) + φ(R, t) +
∑
j
JijSj(t− 1); (4)
where ǫi(t) is the instantaneous contribution to the in-
tention that is specific to i, and φ(R, t) is an average of
the intentions of the fellow denizens expressed in a recent
past. This average can be seen as a space dependent ‘cul-
tural’ field which encodes all the local, stable features that
influence the final decision. In essence, this component
2 Memory effects, or more complicated time dependent ef-
fects can be implemented along the lines of [43,7].
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Fig. 3. Spatial correlations Cτ (r) of logarithmic turnout rates (left) and Cρ(r) of winning votes (right), showing a logarithmic
dependence on r with a cut-off distance L ≈ 300 km. The average logarithmic slope λ2 is found to be ≈ 0.065±0.01 for turnout
rates, and ≈ 0.11±0.02 for winning votes (removing the 2000 referendum on the reform of the presidential mandate, considered
to be a very technical subject for which the turnout rate was exceptionally low, see Table 1.)
should be relatively smooth over both space and time. The
last term describe the influence of the decision of others,
with couplings Jij that measure the strength with which
the decision/intention of individual j influences i. J > 0
means conformity of choices, whereas J < 0 encodes dis-
sent. Many situations (like the movie and the clapping
examples given above) are described by a mean-field cou-
pling to the average decision of others: Jij = J0/N , ∀i 6= j,
or to the average intention of others. Finally, the decision
rule is Si(t) = Θ(ϕi(t) − Φc), with Θ(x ≥ 0) = 1 and
Θ(x < 0) = 0. 3 Note that within such a threshold model,
the intention field is defined up to an arbitrary scale and
shift. There is no physical unit of intention, nor any par-
3 The process leading from ϕ to S is assumed to be deter-
ministic and instantaneous when the final decision is taken.
But in fact, one could add an extra source of randomness by
assuming that the probability to choose S = 1 grows as a cer-
tain smooth function of ϕ − Φc without changing the essence
ticular meaning to ϕ = 0: only differences of intentions
can matter in the evolution of the ϕi’s.
Note that without the ‘cultural field’ φ(R, t) and with
a random static idiosyncratic term ǫi, Eq. (4) boils down
to the Random Field Ising Model [44,45], with first appli-
cations to social dynamics appearing in [46,47], see also
[7,8]. For early studies and/or critical reflections in socio-
physics [48], see e.g. [49–54].
As noted above the intra-commune correlations be-
tween votes may be due to direct imitations between mem-
bers of the same family (between which intentions are of-
ten shared). But the long-ranged spatial correlations can-
not be due to the imitation of decision term. One rea-
son is, as noted above, that elections are not situations
where the actual decision of others can matter, since it
of the discussion to follow. In fact, this randomisation can be
re-absorbed in an appropriate change of P (ǫ).
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is known too late. Interestingly, however, the data itself
strongly rejects a model where the field φ(R, t) is short-
ranged correlated, while assigning the spatial correlations
of τ to a coupling term Jαβ between nearby communes.
The reason this model cannot be made to work is the
following: for long-ranged correlations to emerge, the cou-
pling J must be such that the system is close to its critical
point Jc, beyond which imitation is so strong that the so-
lution of the coupled equations giving the {Si} becomes
multi-valued. But when this is the case, the corresponding
distribution of turnout rates becomes very wide, or even
bimodal, and negatively skewed in a way that is incom-
patible with the unimodal, positively skewed and rather
narrow distribution observed empirically (see Fig. 1). A
detailed discussion of the inadequacy of this model in the
case of elections is provided in [35]. The long-ranged cor-
relations of τ should, we believe, be sought in the spatial
structure of the cultural field φ(R, t).
From now on, we therefore neglect the direct imitation
component in Eq. (4) above. We introduce the cumulative
distribution of the instantaneous, idiosyncratic component
ǫ: P>(x) =
∫∞
x
dx′P (ǫ). Calling πα = P> (Φc − φ(Rα))
the theoretical turnout rate of commune α, the realized
turnout rate is given by:
pα =
1
Nα
Nα∑
i=1
Si ≈ πα +
√
πα(1− πα)
Nα
ξ, (Nα ≫ 1)
(5)
where ξ a standardised Gaussian noise. We will assume a
logistic distribution for P (ǫ), which will make the follow-
ing discussion particularly transparent, i.e.:
P>(x) = 1
1 + e
x−µ
σǫ
, (6)
where µ is the average of the ǫ and σǫ the width of P (ǫ)
that we assume, for simplicity, to be constant in space
and in time, and that we set equal to unity in the fol-
lowing. The average µ may itself depend both on space
and time, and can be seen as an extra, commune specific
spatial noise that adds up to the smooth cultural field
φ. 4 In fact, we will subtract from φ(R) any short-range
correlated component that we assign to µ(R), such that
by definition, the correlation function of the φ field Cφ(r)
tends smoothly towards 1 when r → 0+.
With this particular logistic choice above, one finds:
τα = ln(
pα
1−pα
)
≈ (φ(Rα) + µ(Rα)− Φc) + 1√
πα(1−πα)Nα
ξ (7)
Up to a shift and a noise component that vanishes when
Nα → ∞, τα and φ(Rα) are now the very same object.
For other choices of the distribution of ǫ, such a strict
identification is not warranted, but we expect that both
object share similar statistical properties.
Within the above identification, the variance of τα is
given by:
σ2τ = σ
2
φ + σ
2
µ + 〈
1
Np(1− p) 〉 ≡ σ
2
φ [1 +A] , (8)
where the ratio of variances A is introduced for later con-
venience. The variance of the logarithmic turnout rate is
4 We actually expect µ to be different in different neighbour-
hoods of the same city, reflecting socio-professional or ethnic
intra-communes variability.
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therefore the result of three effects: (1) the fluctuations
of the smooth cultural field, σ2φ. This quantity is not at-
tached to a particular commune and therefore cannot de-
pend on N ; (2) the fluctuations of the average intentions
in a given commune, σ2µ, that may well depend on N (a
naive guess would be as N−1); and (3) the binomial noise
effect, that scales as N−1. So the extra noise found in the
data (see Fig. 2), that we interpreted above as a sign of
intra-commune herding, may in fact reveal the contribu-
tion of σ2µ.
A way to distinguish the two interpretations is to com-
pute the covariance of the τα for different elections as a
function of N , and compare it to the variance of τα, plot-
ted in Fig. 2. Since the binomial noise is uncorrelated from
election to election, its contribution must drop out from
the covariance of τ for different elections, averaged over
all communes:
Covτ (t, t
′) = 〈τα(t)τα(t′)〉c
= 〈φα(t)φα(t′)〉c + 〈µα(t)µα(t′)〉c, (t 6= t′), (9)
where the index ‘c’ means that we take a cumulant average
over all pairs of elections and all communes. If the bino-
mial noise was the only source of the N dependence of σ2τ ,
the above covariance of the τs at different times should be
independent of N . This is not what the data shows. There
is indeed a residual N -dependence that must be ascribed
to the statistics of the average of idiosyncratic intentions,
µ(R) (although we have no interpretation for the ∼ N−3/2
dependence that we observe. The assumption that the dis-
persion of individual biases, σǫ, is commune-independent
might in fact not be warranted). Interestingly, we have
found that the following relation accounts very well for
the data:
〈Covτ (t, t)〉t ≈ B〈Covτ (t, t′)〉t6=t′ +
〈
1
Np(1− p)
〉
, (10)
where B ≈ 1.5. The remarkable point of this analysis is
that the coefficient of the binomial contribution is found
to be exactly unity, meaning that within this interpre-
tation one does not need to invoke the presence of intra-
communes “clones”, or more precisely that the probability
z of herds is too small to be detectable using our data set
5 The coefficient B simply accounts for the average decay
of the correlation of φ and µ as a function of time, and its
value is compatible with the results shown in Fig. 5 below.
4 The random diffusion equation
We will now argue why it is natural to expect that the
cultural field φ(Rα, t) should obey a noisy diffusion equa-
tion akin to Eq. (2) with an extra global, time dependent
driving term. Although φ(Rα, t) is an rather abstract ob-
ject, the existence of which we postulate, its time evolu-
tion should contain a random term that describes events
that are specific both in time and in space and contribute
to changing the overall mood of a given city, such as the
closing down of a factory or of a military base, important
changes in population, or a particularly charismatic local
leader, for example. This is captured by the term η(R, t),
5 In fact, leaving the coefficient B′ in front of the binomial
contribution free, a regression analysis leads to B′ ≈ 0.7 < 1,
whereas the presence of “clones” would require B′ > 1.
C. Borghesi, J.-P. Bouchaud: Spatial correlations in vote statistics: a diffusive field model for decision-making 11
which we imagine to be correlated in space over some
length scale ℓc comparable to the typical inter-commune
distance, and over a time Tc of, plausibly, several months.
The Laplacian term describes the fact that people them-
selves move around and carry with them some compo-
nents of the local cultural specificity φ(Rα, t). This can
be either by actually moving to a nearby city, or by just
visiting or interacting with acquaintances from the neigh-
bouring cities. The all year round exchange of ideas, infor-
mations and experiences must lead to a local propagation
of φ(Rα, t). Since only difference of intentions matter, the
evolution of the cultural field at Rα can only depend on
the differences φ(Rβ , t)−φ(Rα, t); furthermore, the model
must be invariant under a change of scale of φ. In order to
satisfy these constraints, the most general term describing
the evolution of φ(Rα, t) due to the surrounding influences
takes the following, linear form:
∂φ(Rα, t)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
infl.
=
∑
β
Γαβ [φ(Rβ, t)− φ(Rα, t)], (11)
where Γαβ(rαβ) ≥ 0 is a symmetric influence matrix, that
we assume to decrease over a distance corresponding to
typical daily displacements of individuals, say 10 km or
so. The above equation means that through human inter-
actions, the cultural differences between nearby cities tend
to narrow. As is well known, the continuum limit of the
right hand side of Eq. (11) reads∇·[D(R)∇φ(R, t)], with
D(Rα) =
1
2
∑
β r
2
αβΓαβ is a (space dependent) measure of
the speed at which the cultural field diffuses. This spatial
dependence is a priori expected: for example,D(R) should
presumably be smaller in mountain regions (because of
the difficulty to travel from one valley to the next) or in
sparsely populated areas (because of the larger distance
between neighbouring towns).
Our final equation, that respects all the symmetries of
the model 6, is therefore (in the continuum limit):
∂φ(R, t)
∂t
=∇ · [D(R)∇φ(R, t)] + η(R, t) + ν(R)F (t),
(12)
where F (t) represents the public information, for exam-
ple the subject and importance of the election, national
TV programs, etc. In principle, different communes may
react differently to the same public information, leading
to space dependent ‘reactivity’ ν(R), but we will neglect
these spatial fluctuations in the following. 7 Similarly, we
assume that the variance and higher cumulants of η are
homogeneous and independent of the size of the commune,
but this assumption could be relaxed if needed. Because
any average trend is described by F (t), the noise η(R, t)
is of zero mean. The average trend can be accounted for
by a uniform shift of φ:
φ(R, t) −→ φ(R, t)− ν
∫ t
0
dt′F (t′). (13)
6 Note that φ → −φ is another symmetry of the model,
corresponding to the fact that the propensity to do something
is related to minus the propensity not to do the same thing,
since Θ(ϕ − Φc) = 1 − Θ(Φc − ϕ). The scale invariance and
the shift symmetry of the threshold model in fact only allow
higher order linear derivatives to appear, such as ∇4φ, etc.
These terms do indeed appear in a gradient expansion of Eq.
(11) above.
7 Short-ranged correlated noise in ν(R) does not affect the
logarithmic behaviour of Cφ(r) provided F (t) has a finite cor-
relation time.
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This explains why the average value of φ, and therefore
of the turnout rate τ , can change substantially over time,
while the fluctuations of φ and its spatial correlations re-
main essentially stable – as found empirically, see Figs. 1
and 3.
When D(R) = D is uniform, we recover Eq. (2) and
the logarithmic decay of the correlation function Cτ (r) ∝
Cφ(r) follows immediately, since the contribution of the
idiosyncratic µ field and the binomial noise, both short
ranged in space, rapidly disappear when r > 0. Since we
have removed from φ its short range spatial contribution,
the coefficient Λ2 appearing in Eq. (3) is given by 1/ ln Lℓc .
Therefore,
Cτ (r 6= 0) = Cφ(r)
1 +A
≈ 1
1 +A
× ln
L
r
ln Lℓc
, (14)
whereA is the ratio of the variance of the idiosyncratic and
binomial noise to that of the cultural field, defined in Eq.
(8) above. From Fig. 3, one sees that 1/(1+A) ∼ 0.2−0.4
for turnout rates: the cultural field explains roughly a
third of the variance of the local results. This ratio in-
creases to one half for winning votes, except for the 2000
referendum (see Fig. 3, right plot), meaning that the role
of the cultural field is arguably stronger for polarized po-
litical decisions than it is for the question of participating
or not to a vote.
When D(R) is non uniform, the equilibrium correla-
tion of φ(R) cannot be computed in general. However,
drawing analogies from physics [55], we know that this in-
homogeneous diffusion equation can be, under rather gen-
eral hypothesis on the statistics ofD(R), “homogeneized”.
This means that coarse graining on sufficiently large scales,
larger than the correlation length of D(R), the effective
equation becomes identical to Eq. (2) with an effective
diffusion constant D that can be computed using e.g. per-
turbation theory, or effective medium approximations [55].
What is of interest for our discussion is that the logarith-
mic dependence of Cφ(r), Eq. (3), is still valid on large
enough scales.
In order to test these ideas more quantitatively, we
have simulated the model using Eq. (11) with the exact lo-
cations of all french communes, and Γαβ(r) = e
−r/ℓc . The
spatially inhomogeneities are therefore treated exactly. We
show the resulting spatial correlations of φ(R) in Fig. 4-
left, for different values of ℓc, in the range [1.5, 7.5] km,
i.e. comparable with the inter-town average distance. We
see that Cφ(r) is indeed approximately logarithmic and
looks actually very similar to the empirical curves. Note
in particular that while the small r value of Cφ(r) and
the logarithmic slope Λ2 significantly depends on ℓc, as
expected, the point r at which Cφ(r) reaches zero is ap-
proximately constant, and, remarkably, very close to its
empirical counterpart (L ≈ 300 km, on the order of the
size of the system). It is tempting to associate the apparent
dependence of λ2 on the election to a temporal evolution
of ℓc. However, this is not correct: our numerical simu-
lations show that even when the system is equilibrated
(i.e. when t ≫ L2/D), the measured Cφ(r) for a fixed
value of ℓc fluctuates quite strongly between different re-
alizations of the noise η, see Fig. 4-right. The range over
which Λ2 varies in the simulation is very similar to what
is found empirically. Therefore, the empirical results are
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Fig. 4. Numerical simulation of the diffusive field model, with the true positions of the French communes, and an interaction
between nearby communes decaying as exp(−r/ℓc). Left, we show the correlation Cφ(R) as a function of ℓc, after transient
regime and averaged over many realizations of the ‘noise’ η. The distance R is here measured in units of the average inter-
commune distance (that depends on the departement. R = 100 corresponds to 270 km, precisely the scale at which the empircal
correlations reach zero. Right, ten realizations of Cφ(R) for ℓc = 4.5 km, still after transient regime, as a function of the scaled
distance R. In the inset, value of the nearest neighbour correlation C(R = 1) as a function of ‘time’, showing strong fluctuations.
fully compatible with a fixed value of ℓc. Matching the
average empirical slope to the numerical data and taking
into account the value of A suggests that ℓc must be very
small, of the order of a few kms, fully compatible with our
interpretation. We have checked in our numerical simula-
tions that our diffusive field model indeed reproduces the
strong linear correlation between τα and the average value
of τβ over the neighbouring towns, with unit slope. This is
of course expected and is the essence of the model, since
the Laplacian coupling in Eq. (2) says precisely that on av-
erage the Laplacian of φ is zero, i.e. that φα is on average
equal to
∑
β∈n(α) φβ , where n(α) is the neighbourhood of
α. This empirical finding can in fact be seen as a direct,
microscopic motivation for postulating Eq. (11) above.
In order to estimate the diffusion of intentions D, one
can assume that a substantial fraction of the population of
a given town experiences some interaction with neighbour-
ing towns after several weeks. For opinions to get closer,
this time is probably more on the scale of months. Taking
the relevant inter-town distance to be ∼ 10 km leads to a
diffusion constant of the order of D ∼ 100 km2/month or
less (ways of obtaining more precise empirical estimates of
this quantity would be important here). The correspond-
ing equilibration time Teq over L = 300 km is therefore
quite long, a century or more. But this is compatible with
the fact that the voting habits of the different regions seem
to be extremely persistent in history – which is in itself a
strong argument for the existence of a cultural field that
keeps the memory independently of the presence of partic-
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ular individuals. This justifies the apparent correlation be-
tween geography and votes discussed long ago by Siegfried
[11] (Le granite vote a` droite, le calcaire vote a` gauche). In-
terestingly, a more precise prediction of our model is that
the temporal autocorrelation of φ for a given R should
behave as:
Cφ(t) =
〈φ(R, t)φ(R, 0)〉
〈φ(R, t)2〉 ≈ −
Λ2
2 ln
t
Teq
,
ℓ2c
D , Tc ≪ t≪ Teq, (15)
where the slope is exactly one half of the slope of Cφ(r)
versus − ln r, and Tc the correlation time of the noise η.
We have tested this prediction directly on data, by study-
ing the autocorrelation of the fluctuations of the partici-
pation rate for a given commune across different elections,
averaged over all communes. Although the data is noisy,
see Fig. 5, the results are indeed compatible with a log-
arithmic decay in time with a slope that has the correct
order of magnitude. From the spatial correlations of τ we
find λ2 ≈ 0.065 (averaged over all elections – see Fig.
3), whereas the linear regression of Cτ (t) as a function
of ln t gives as slope of ≈ −0.066. The discrepancy with
the factor 2 predicted by the theory could be related to
the fact that the autocorrelation in time is substantially
larger than the correlation in space (compare Figs. 3 and
5), meaning that the idiosyncratic field µ(R, t) has sub-
stantially longer temporal correlations than spatial corre-
lations. If the correlation time of the noise η is of several
months, the contribution of the decorrelation of µ(R, t) to
Cτ (t) probably interferes with the contribution of the cul-
tural field φ and effectively increases the empirical slope.
1 10 100 1000|ti - tj|  (in weeks)
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
C τ
( |t
i -
 
t j| )
Fig. 5. Temporal correlation Cτ (t) of turnout rates τ . Here,
t = |ti − tj | where ti and tj are the election dates of elections.
The red line shows the expected Cτ (t) ∼ −
1
2
λ2 ln(t) where
λ2 ≈ 0.065 is the averaged slope over all elections of the spatial
correlations Cτ (r) ∼ −λ
2 ln(r). The blue line shows the linear
regression of Cτ (t) as a function of ln(t), here with a slope of
≈ −0.066.
In any case, in the absence of more information on the
dynamics of the µ field, we find the overall agreement be-
tween the model and the behaviour of these temporal au-
tocorrelations satisfying.
5 Conclusion
Let us summarise the main messages of this study. First,
the statistics of the turnout rates in French elections is
found to be surprisingly stable over time, once the aver-
age turnout rate is factored in. The size dependence of the
turnout rate variance may have suggested some intra city
‘herding’ effect, but we believe that the data is more con-
sistent with small towns having a larger dispersion in local,
idiosyncratic biases. A convincing argument for why this
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should be so is however lacking. An explanation could be
the systematic difference in the socio-cultural background
of the population of large cities compared to that of small
cities.
Second, for our whole set of elections, the spatial cor-
relation of the turnout rates, or of the fraction of winning
votes, is found to decay logarithmically with the distance
between towns. This slow decay of the correlations is char-
acteristic of a diffusive random field in two dimensions.
This result is robust against many non essential modifica-
tions of the basic version of the model, much as the statis-
tics of a random walk is robust against modifications of the
microscopic construction rules. Based on these empirical
observations and on the analogy with the two-dimensional
random diffusion equation, we have proposed that individ-
ual decisions can be rationalised in terms of an underly-
ing “cultural” field that locally biases the decision of the
population of a given region, on top of an idiosyncratic,
city-dependent field, with short range correlations.
Based on symmetry considerations and a set of plausi-
ble arguments, we have suggested that this cultural field
obeys an equation in the universality class of the ran-
dom diffusion equation, Eq. (12) above. We believe that
similar considerations should hold for other decision pro-
cesses, such as consumption habits, behavioral biases, etc.
More empirical work on the spatial correlations of these
decisions, in different situations and in different countries,
would be very valuable to test our claim of universality. Di-
rect estimates of the parameters of the model, such as the
value of the diffusion constantD or the relative strength of
the idiosyncratic field, are clearly needed at this stage. We
hope that our work will motivate more empirical studies
to refine and calibrate the model proposed here.
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